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Abstract:
In this paper, I investigate the validity of the widely held assumption that high rates of youth
unemployment will lead a state to experience internal armed conflict. I hypothesize that as youth
unemployment rates increase, a state will have a larger number of internal armed conflicts occur
annually. This can happen via three causal mechanisms: 1) opportunity cost calculations; 2)
private frustrations, resentment, and feelings of stagnation turning into public grievances; 3) and
emotional and psychological triggers leading to participation in violent insurgent activities. I find
that while youth unemployment does have a statistically significant influence on the number of
internal armed conflicts within a given state, other variables have a far greater effect. This
research contributes to the growing body of literature arguing that the assumption above is
empirically unsupported, and that more weight should be placed on other causal factors that have
a far greater influence on the incidence of internal armed conflicts.
Introduction
It has commonly been accepted by scholars within the discipline of political economy
that as growing numbers of young people are unable to find gainful opportunities for
employment, the likelihood that a state will experience a growing number of violent internal
conflicts rises. The general postulate assumes that as rates of youth unemployment (and levels of
under-employment) increase, social tensions escalate alongside these persons’ private
frustrations. Sentiments of restlessness and resentment arise from the realization that the standard
milestones of adulthood are no longer unattainable: a spouse, a dowry, a house, stable
employment, children, etc. Young people that are dissatisfied with their socio-economic standing
become easier targets for insurgent groups to recruit, as they can promise better income-earning
opportunities, thereby reducing the opportunity cost of engaging in violent and illicit activities.
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Actors with violent goals can take advantage of these individual’s grievances towards the
government and the state and incentivize them to change society by force.
The general phenomenon described above has been documented by many political
economists throughout recent history, with an increasing number of academics using case studies
from individual countries such as Nigeria or Liberia (and even regions such as the Middle East)
to justify their support for this assumption. In fact, some have come to believe that “without jobs,
young people are prone to engage in violence, ‘they possess their own culture of violence,’ [and]
they are a threat to society” (Idris 2016, 7). Yet, this presumption has never been empirically
proven—there is no single study that has been able to concretely prove a strong automatic causal
link between youth unemployment and civil war occurrences in a cross-national analysis. The
belief that young unemployed people rebel is simply that, a belief. My goal for this paper is to
contribute a foundational causal link between high rates of youth unemployment and occurrence
of internal armed conflicts, to provide statistical support to the postulate that has already been
accepted by most academics within this discipline. My research question should establish this
relationship as it asks:
To what extent does youth unemployment status affect the number of annual internal armed
conflict within a state?
I predict that states with higher levels of youth unemployment will experience a larger
number of internal armed conflicts per year. I use a dependent variable that measures the number
of internal armed conflicts in a given year in a regression model with a central explanatory
variable that measures the rates of unemployed youth of the total labor force in a given country.
My linear regression model shows that there is some statistical support for this claim, although
its strength is relatively small compared to the influence that the other variables included in the
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model have on the dependent variable. Each variable included in the model proved to be
statistically significant, although the control variables had larger coefficients than did the central
explanatory variable. This illustrates that while there is some support for the widespread
acceptance of the assumption that young unemployed people cause internal armed conflicts,
more research is needed to truly assess the strength of the causal link.
Moreover, more research is needed to ensure that the many non-governmental agencies,
NGOs, and donor groups that funnel massive amounts of development aid into countries affected
by conflict are actually positively influencing the situation, rather than wasting their resources.
Countless programs are based on the belief that creating jobs and increasing employment rates
reduces societal tension by lessening economic tensions. The general reasoning of these groups
is that “employment schemes and economic growth can provide a ‘peace dividend,’ which will
leave the population disinclined to return to conflict” (Walton 2010, 2). This issue is becoming
all the more pressing, given that academics are suggesting that “around six hundred million jobs
need to be created just to keep unemployment rates constant” as an anticipated “one billion youth
[are] expected to enter the job market in the next decade” (Idris 2016, 2). These programs are
implemented to influence the size of the labor market to absorb the burgeoning population of
young people aging into the workforce. But if this assumption is unfounded and incorrect, and
young unemployed people do not increase the number of internal armed conflicts in any
statistically significant sense, the policy implications are innumerable. More research into this
topic is required to ensure that the good intentions of these groups have the potential to make a
positive difference.
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Relevant Literature
There is a large body of research to draw from in order to establish my theoretical
foundation, given how widespread the ‘unemployed-youth-to-insurgent-pipeline’ assumption is
within the discipline of political economy. It is useful to first define the two most important
terms of my research: youth and unemployment. The ‘youth’ age group, established by the UN
Programme on Youth, defines ‘youth’ as any persons between the ages of 15 and 24. Within this
age range, individuals are beginning to transition from childhood to adulthood, and moving from
the home and into society. Some academics suggest that youth should be defined in literature “as
both an age range and a social construct,” considering the cultural contexts around the age group
itself (Idris 2016, 8). Unemployed youth are defined as those without work who are available and
actively seeking a job, according to the definition established and utilized by both the
International Labor Organization and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD 2003). According to the UN Programme on Youth, “young people
between the ages of 15-24 represent approximately 18% of the global population, nearly 1.2
billion people” (UN Programme on Youth 2010, 10). Additionally, approximately 87% of youth
live in developing countries, with 62% living in Asia and 17% living in Africa. Contextually for
my research, “the global youth unemployment rate was 13 percent in 2014, with wide regional
variations—the highest rates being in the Middle East and North Africa” (Idris 2016, 2;
Abdelkarim 2018). As more people age into a labor market ill-equipped to absorb them, youth
unemployment rates will unavoidably increase.
There are three main schools of thought that establish the theoretical relationship between
youth unemployment and internal armed conflict, designed by three men: Gary Becker, Paul
Collier, and Christopher Cramer. All three men argue “that unemployed young [people] have a
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low opportunity cost for engaging in violence and joining armed groups,” each with their own
variation and theoretical framework for why this is valid (Cramer 2015, 1). Becker’s framework
is centered on economic considerations, with great importance placed on an individual’s
opportunity cost calculation. Collier’s model also uses an opportunity cost calculation but allows
for other socio-political considerations to factor into the decision, rather than relying on pure
economics. On the other hand, Cramer’s model does not consider economic calculations to be
the greatest motivating factor—he sees psychological and emotional variables as more influential
on a young person’s decision to engage in armed violence.
Opportunity Costs and Economic Considerations
Becker’s theory of criminality specifically predicts that as potential options for gainful
employment decreases, so do the opportunity costs of committing crimes, therefore making
illegal markets an attractive choice for income-earning opportunities. He does not theorize that
individuals engage in criminal behavior for the sake of committing crime, but instead claims
“that participation in a legal or illegal act is best comprehended as an attempt to satisfy basic
necessities” (Adekoya & Abdul-Razak 2018, 160). Becker thus views the decision to engage in
crime and rebel activity as an economic calculation, with individuals weighing the opportunity
costs of participation in both legal and illegal markets to decide which will be most profitable.
According to this logic, as gainful opportunities for employment decrease and youth
unemployment rises, the option of joining an insurgent group and engaging in violence becomes
increasingly attractive for generating income. A young person’s decision to join an armed group
“is feasible only when the potential gain from joining is so high and the expected costs so low
that rebel recruits will favor joining over alternative income-earning opportunities” (Azeng &
Thierry 2013, 3). This theoretical thinking is not entirely without circumstantial support, as there
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is some evidence that a small population of young insurgents chose to engage in violence due to
the “financial advantages of fighting” (Walton 2010, 3). However, this causal mechanism is still
without concrete empirical support.
Becker’s theory of criminality and its application to insurgencies have been tested and
empirically examined by other authors and international organizations, with the same assumption
being concluded. One study actually found directly “that unemployment increases the
opportunity to commit violence” in Nigeria, providing some circumstantial statistical support for
the notion that unemployed youth are inherently something to be concerned about (Adekoya &
Abdul-Razak 2018, 172). A US Agency for International Development report on youth and
armed conflict in 2005 asserts that:
“young people often participate in violence because membership in extremist
organizations provides immediate economic benefits, because violence itself offers opportunities
for economic gain through direct payment or looting, or because conflict promises to open up
longer term economic options, for example, through patronage if ‘their’ ethnic or religious group
captures power” (4).
Adekoya & Abdul-Razak (2018) supported this report, writing that youth “participation is
attached to the gain they would receive either by cash given to them by their recruiters or by
financial gain realized after selling stolen goods and properties” (162). These studies indicate
that for many young unemployed people, income-earning potential is the greatest motivating
factor in the decision regarding whether or not to engage in internal armed conflicts.
Economic and Socio-Political Considerations
Collier structures his model around the notion that people choose to engage in violent
actions due to their greed and grievance motivations. He argues that high rates of unemployment
directly contribute to violent rebel activity; given “that unemployment [is] a source of
grievance—providing a motive alongside greed,” young unemployed people have no other
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option to address their greed/grievances besides engaging in violent armed conflict (Idris 2016,
6). The decision to join an insurgency is based on whether the rebels can assure individuals that
their grievances will be heard and addressed. This decision is considered to be more of a sociopolitical calculation than an economic one since a person factors social considerations into the
decision as well. Collier places great weight on unemployment as the main measure to predict
the likelihood of armed conflict. He “[sees] unemployment as the likely route through which
[economic] growth could affect violence” (Idris 2016, 6). Donor groups and NGOs have
centered their humanitarian work around this notion, since they focus on improving
unemployment rates for their possible ‘peace dividend’ effects.
Academics have also supported Collier’s theoretical framework, agreeing that as
individuals find themselves without employment, there is a greater likelihood that their private
frustrations will turn into public grievances, eventually leading to recruitment into insurgent
groups (Berman & Callen, et al. 2009). Cramer (2011) suggests that “trends in employment and
unemployment are a major part of a larger social structure and set of relations” and the
breakdown of these relations can have violent and destabilizing effects (11). Walton (2010)
asserts that as youth are unable to find employment and achieve the standards of adulthood,
“taking up arms against the state or the political elite in these contexts can provide a means by
which they can integrate into society (albeit by force) or gain the sense of purpose and
recognition denied by ordinary society” (3). McLean Hilker & Fraser (2009) also supports this
perspective—that various social, economic, and political barriers have led to the exclusion of
young people from society and contribute to their feelings of discrimination and marginalization.
In these cases, insurgents are able to promise a reordering of society and a new form of
governance, which will provide a place for the burgeoning youth population. Urdal (2006)
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supports this causal pathway, by claiming that “demographic trends and pressures are creating
tensions that lead to the outbreak of low-intensity conflicts such as protests or riots, or more
organized political upheaval and internal armed conflict” (Azeng & Yogo 2013, 3). Violent rebel
groups are able to take advantage of the pathway that leads toward youth’s private frustrations,
resentment, and feelings of stagnation. They push these feelings to become public grievances and
incentivize violent behaviors as a way of forcing societal change.
Psychological, Emotional, and Other Considerations
As a political economist, Cramer also sees high unemployment among young people as
one of the main predictors of internal armed conflict within a state, but not for economic or
socio-political reasons. Cramer’s model suggests a direct correlation between employment status
and the potential for violent behavior, because of psychological and emotional motivations. He
writes “that unemployment triggers participation in insurgencies, prompts people to join violent
gangs, drives people to extremism, [and is] the primary reason behind domestic violence”
(Cramer 2015, 1). The decision to engage in these violent behaviors comes from emotional and
psychological considerations, rather than from any economic factors. However, Cramer is quick
to note early on in his scholarship that researchers and actors such as donor groups should not
focus on unemployment rates as the sole variable for measuring and predicting violence
participation. He argues that “specific variables, such as unemployment, typically have rather
complex implications for violent outcomes; and that labor market and economic policy, if they
are to be part of an effort to reduce violence, cannot be reduced to policies designed simply to
maximize the number of work opportunities available” (Cramer 2010, 2). He advocates for other
approaches, such as ones centered around the labor market: “if the labor market cannot absorb a
sudden surplus of young job-seekers, a large pool of unemployed youths will generate strong
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frustration” (Azeng & Yogo 2013, 3). Youth unemployment rates should not be the only
approach for promoting peace when other economic approaches could likely have a greater
potential.
Labor market concerns are becoming more widespread in areas with bulging youth
populations, due to these theoretical warnings that establish a causal link between unemployment
and insurgent violence. As more people age into the workforce to find that there are little to no
options for gainful employment, their decision-making processes become severely manipulated
by rebel groups towards attractive criminal and insurgent behavior. One study done by Urdal
(2012) finds that “when youth represent more than 35% of the adult population, which they do in
many developing countries, the risk of armed conflict is 150% higher than in countries with an
age structure similar to most developed countries” (7-8). In countries such as these, “where there
is an abundance of easily lootable resources,” insurgent groups find that “the costs of organizing
rebellion are lower,” especially “where there is a large youth population (which is relatively
cheap to recruit)” (Walton 2010, 2). Most scholars assert that “it is not uncommon that people
engage in violence are linked to poverty or areas with few opportunities and poor economic
background” (Adekoya & Abdul-Razak 2018, 164). With over one billion young people
expected to enter the labor market within the next decade, many researchers, and leaders of states
with these economic conditions, fear for potential future violent instability (Idris 2016).
Blattman & Annan (2015) designed their own field experiment in Liberia to assess the
capacity of gainful employment opportunities to reduce lawlessness and rebellion. They
evaluated an agricultural program targeted towards ex-combatants in Liberia who were engaging
in various illicit industry activities around the country. The authors find “large impacts on returns
to legal work (and the opportunity cost of illegal work), but no statistically significant evidence
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of impacts on the behaviors and attitudes associated connections to commanders, peer quality,
non-material forms of violence, community participation, or attitudes to crime and violence”
(Blattman & Annan 2015, 36). These results illustrate the influence that employment has on
modifying the opportunity cost calculation of participating in insurgent activities. Moreover,
their research indicates “that getting trained and becoming a successful farmer raised men’s
community esteem and lowered men’s social marginalization” (Blattman & Annan 2015, 36).
These findings are theoretically supported by the standard reasoning that men without gainful
employment feel stigmatization and discrimination, making them turn to violent rebel groups in
order to force society to accept and integrate them.
Oppositional Literature
While there has been widespread acceptance of the assumption that unemployed youth
increase the number of armed conflicts within a state, it is necessary to also review literature that
has not found this to be valid. Many academics who oppose the presumption do so since “there is
barely any reliable evidence on youth unemployment in any developing country,” especially
states that experience high rates of conflict, making any conclusions inherently weak and
circumstantial (Cramer 2011, 1). In other cases, data are simply missing, and the variable used
actually measures other factors relating to the fundamental question, not necessarily youth
participation in armed conflicts. Some researchers have outright dismissed the assumption based
on their models; Berman & Callen et al. have “emphatically [rejected] a positive correlation
between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces,” illustrating that with
their model, “there is no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent
attacks that kill civilians” (Berman & Callen et al. 2009, 1). Notwithstanding the above data
constraints, other scholars have drawn their own theoretical conclusions on why unemployment
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is not the greatest motivating factor to engage in insurgent activities. For some young people,
economic considerations may not even matter in comparison to other reasons; it is possible that
“while fighting is risky, sometimes being a civilian is riskier, and so many men join armed
groups for the security they provide” (Blattman & Annan 2015, 2). Academics sometimes also
compare research on gangs and similar organizations to “suggest that the key motivator might
not be wages but demand drivers such as status, ideology, outrage, or a desire for justice”
(Blattman & Annan 2015, 2).
While Cramer is one of the more cited scholars on this topic theoretically, he has been
cited consistently for his own oppositional stance, asserting that “there are no grounds
empirically for the commonly made claims that there is a strong, automatic causal connection
from unemployment, under-employment, or low productivity employment to violence and war”
(Cramer 2011, 2). He explicitly states that evidence to support the relationship between youth
unemployment and participation in insurgencies “is largely circumstantial and the claims often
made on deductive, abstract grounds” (Cramer 2011, 17). He writes that even as
“employment from a number of conflicts suggests that employment issues, including
unemployment, can be significant features of the processes leading to violent conflict as well as
of its dynamics once under way…that unemployment is generally not the most significant causal
feature or even facilitating (recruitment) factor.” (18).
Moreover, Cramer suggests that “unemployment may be linked to violence without group
organization…; unemployment may be linked to a wish to be part of a group, whether violent or
not; and it may be linked to deriving meaning from belonging to a group with a high salience of
violence” (Cramer 2011, 6). There is no reason to draw an immediate causal assumption, that
any unemployed youth is participating in violence activities because of their unemployment
status. He asserts that there is some evidence— “though contested and not enough evidence—
that terrorism (and support for terrorism) is not correlated with poverty and unemployment,
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despite very widespread claims and assumptions to the contrary” (Cramer 2010, 6). For Cramer,
the whole presumption is based on a flawed logical framework and any policies aimed towards
mitigating conflict should factor in other considerations as well.
These arguments are mirrored by Walton’s research on the topic; she notes, that in many
instances, “the motivating factor behind violence was not unemployment per se, but rather
grievances at an unjust and corrupt patrimonial system that increasingly shut out young people”
(Walton 2010, 2). She believes that while unemployment may play a role in the decision to join
an insurgency, a person’s unemployment status is the result of other far greater economic
inequalities. She adapts Collier’s framework to show that “frustration at lack of livelihood
opportunities can play a part in motivating youth violence,” but adds that “social and political
grievances are usually more central” (Walton 2010, 2). Instead of using unemployment as the
main causal variable to predict the likelihood that young individuals will participate in violent
armed conflict, Walton suggests factors such as “availability of weapons, levels of drug use,
indoctrination, recruitment by force, ideology, leadership factors, organization dynamics, and
trigger events” (Walton 2010, 3). Her position here is best explained by the notion that
unemployment is a necessary, but insufficient motivating variable in the occurrence of armed
conflict. For Walton, there are other causal mechanisms that have a stronger impact on the
potential for armed conflict within young unemployed cohorts.
Walton (2010) further notes that in developing countries, unemployment is not even an
option—people “need to engage in some kind of productive activity in order to survive” (2). This
contributes a foundation to the growing number of academics arguing that under-employment
may be just as indicative of internal armed conflict as regular unemployment. McLean Hilker &
Fraser (2009) insist on including under-employment with unemployment in scholarly work,
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writing that “menial jobs with little prospect of advancement may also be a cause of youth
frustration, embarrassment, and social separation…[This] can cause conflict or lead to youth
involvement” in insurgencies or organized criminal activity (4). This notion is also supported by
Abdelkarim (2017), who writes that “the marginalization that can be a potential source of
conflict is found not in open unemployment, but in low productivity and poorly recognized work
in informal settings” (13). Additionally, the issue that “young people are over-represented in the
informal economy,” exacerbates whatever social tensions may already be brewing outside of
economic conditions (Idris 2016, 10). If young individuals are working in an unofficial capacity,
making low wages, and have no potential to advance, it would be perfectly reasonable to
anticipate their recruitment into an insurgency. Cramer addresses this point directly, as he
believes that “underemployment may be as significant as unemployment, as may be irregular
employment. The type of employment opportunities available may be significant rather than
simply whether or not such opportunities are available” (Cramer 2011, 6). Assuming that youth
participation in violent behaviors could be addressed by simply modifying the labor market is far
too reductionist for the academics that hold this position.
The role of young unemployed women specifically in internal armed conflict is highly
debated and absent from much statistical literature. It is well-known that women do participate in
violence, in their own ways and with their own motivating factors that may or may not align
generally with men’s. McLean Hilker & Fraser (2009) suggest that “women may get involved in
violence because they see it as a means to challenge gender norms” rather than an immediate
effect of unemployment. For such a significant group to be engaged in armed conflict, the lack of
evidence on their motivations is astounding; for some (possibly sexist) reason, there “tends to be
an assumption that youth in the context of unemployment and violence refers only to young
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males, not females” (Idris 2016, 2). Moreover, in many cultures, there is no ‘youth’ category for
women; they simply move from childhood to adulthood (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009). One
reason for the lack of empirical study is the limitation of the data itself: “gender-disaggregated
data on youth unemployment in developing countries are limited, despite female youth
unemployment rates often exceeding those of males” (Idris 2016, 3). Studies approximate that
“women make up 10-40% of armed forces and insurgent groups worldwide and, beyond
combatant roles, young women take on a variety of non-military support roles” (McLean Hilker
& Fraser 2009, 3). For such a large part of any state’s population and labor force to be absent
from literature calls into question the validity that only unemployed men cause armed conflict
due to their unemployment status. If a sizable proportion of women are unsatisfied, unemployed,
and ignored, there is the potential for a serious societal upheaval.
Explanation of Causal Mechanisms:
I identify opportunity cost calculations as the first causal mechanism since various
political economic theorists have thoroughly explored it. This causal mechanism relates purely to
economic motivations and theorizes that individuals join insurgencies and rebellions to advance
their personal economic interests. As the number of gainful employment opportunities decrease,
young unemployed individuals will be attracted to insurgencies in order to generate income and
survive (Walton 2010). In areas with high rates of poverty and a large cohort of young people,
rebel groups can more easily recruit individuals into their ranks by promising wealth from their
illicit activities. Moreover, the larger the group of young people aging into the workforce, the
less likely that the labor market will be able to absorb them and the cheaper it will be for
insurgents to recruit them, therefore inevitably leading to higher rates of internal armed conflicts
(Cramer 2011).
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My second causal mechanism concerns the process by which private frustrations and
resentment turn into public grievances, leading to the decision to engage in violent behaviors
(Idris 2016). Young unemployed people become frustrated with their personal political and
economic statuses and feel as though society has not adequately integrated them as they
transition into adulthood (Berman & Callen et al. 2009). Similar to the labor market argument,
these individuals leave childhood only to find that they do not have a place in their world, or
come to believe that their government has intentionally arranged to exclude and discriminate
against them. This leads to people seeing armed violence against the state as the only pathway to
change their livelihood and force recognition from their governments. Rebel groups take
advantage of these motivations and frustrations to manipulate any opportunity calculations by
promising a changed social order and new places for youth to find gainful political and economic
opportunities (USAID 2005).
My last causal mechanism is the feeling of stagnation among unemployed youth, as they
transition from childhood to adulthood, and from the home to society (Walton 2010). This
process requires gainful employment in order for individuals to attain the standard metrics that
signify their movement from childhood to adulthood: marriage, ability to afford a dowry,
children, a stable home, etc. (Idris 2016). Persons aging into a society that is unable to absorb
and integrate them find that these material metrics of adulthood are farther away than past
generations, or perhaps even unattainable. Most literature on this topic has also identified this to
be one of the major causal mechanisms, with researchers arguing that “the structural exclusion
and lack of opportunities faced by young people effectively block or prolong their transition to
adulthood and can lead to frustration, disillusionment and, in some cases, their engagement in
violence” (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, 4). This mechanism combines both the political and
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economic motivations, without relying on the concept of opportunity costs. For many people in
developing areas without employment, the costs are not considered because there is no other
choice.
Given the potential strength of these causal mechanisms, I hypothesize that:
Countries with higher levels of youth unemployment will experience a larger annual number of
internal armed conflicts than will countries with lower levels of youth unemployment.
I hypothesize a positive relationship between my central explanatory variable and my
dependent variable. Moreover, I predict that my first two control variables, ethnic
fractionalization, and total population, will both have a positive effect on the dependent variable
while my third control variable, real GDP, will have a negative effect on the number of internal
armed conflicts.
Research Design and Data:
All of the variables I use can be found in The Quality of Government Institute’s QoG
Standard Dataset for 2022. This dataset was created by combining several datasets covering
eighteen topics from health to economic and social policies (Teorell et. al, 2022). The dataset
that I employ is a cross-national time-series dataset, and therefore well-suited to the model I run.
The dataset includes observations for the time period1946 to 2021, “and the unit of analysis is
country-year” (Teorell et. al 2022). I have chosen to run a linear regression model with three
control variables to investigate the relationship between the number of internal armed conflicts
and youth employment rates. The linear regression model is used to determine the relationship
between the dependent and the independent variables, while also showing the direction of the
relationships. For every coefficient unit in the independent and control variables, there will be a
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subsequent unit increase/decrease in the dependent variable. The model analyzes data between
1991 and 2019, due to the time constraints on my independent variable. Given my hypothesis, I
predict that the higher the level of youth unemployment in a given state, the greater the number
of internal armed conflicts the state will experience.
Key Dependent Variable:
My dependent variable is the ucdp_type3 variable, which measures “the number of
internal armed conflicts per country in a given year” between the years 1946 to 2020. This
variable is originally part of the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Teorell et. al 2022). There are 1321 cases
included in this variable, from thirty-six states. The variable is now coded as a range from 0-5,
with zero representing no internal armed conflicts in a given year and five as the maximum
number of internal armed conflicts that a country experiences within a given year (Pettersson
2020). I recoded the variable to allow for a zero number of conflicts (meaning no internal armed
conflicts were recorded in a given year), rather than allowing the model to read the data as
simply ‘missing’ as it was in the original dataset. This modifies how the model interprets and
runs the data, to better answer my research question since I am seeking to understand the extent
to which youth employment status influences a state’s potential for conflict.
Central Explanatory/Independent Variable:
My central explanatory variable is the wdi_unempyilo variable, which measures the
levels of youth employment in each state (World Bank 2021). This variable, which originally
came from a dataset created by the World Bank, uses the age group between 15-24, given that it
has become the standard of ‘youth’ for political scientists and economists. The data covers the
rates of youth unemployment between the years 1991 to 2019, and 178 states. There is potential
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for the variable to be relatively weak, given that a significant majority of young unemployed
people live in developing countries that do not regularly keep records of this data. Additionally,
this variable has the greatest constraint on time as it only covers 28 years’ worth of youth
unemployment data. This variable was coded numerically to correspond to the rates of
unemployment per episode with a total of 5076 observations. The total range of the
unemployment rates are .37 to 65.44 percent.
Control Variables:
The first control variable is fe_etfra, which represents “the probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country will belong to different such [ethnic] groups” (Teorell et. al
2022, 301). High rates of ethnic fractionalization have been identified in the general literature as
contributing to an increased number of internal armed conflicts, thus requiring the need to
control for its influence (Wegenast & Basedau 2013). The variable originally came from a
dataset created by James D. Fearon (2003), who “[identified] 822 ethnic and ‘ethnoreligious’
groups in 160 countries” between the years 1946 to 2021 (Teorell et. al 2022, 301). Fearon
operationalizes the data as a percent range between 0 (perfectly homogenous) and 1 (highly
fragmented).
I generated two new variables for the other two control variables by taking the natural log
of each, in order to decrease the numerical discrepancies between any given state and suppress
abnormal skews. Taking the natural log of the following variables allowed me to achieve more
consistent variance across the data since it forces the variables into a smaller distribution. The
variables are still able to retain their original significance within the model’s output while still
forcing a more linear result. The first natural logged variable is total population, generated from
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the World Bank’s wdi_pop, which measures the total population of all residents regardless of
legal status and citizenship (World Bank 2021). The datapoint covers 192 countries from the
year 1960 to 2020. I chose total population as my second control variable since a majority of
literature asserts that a state with a higher total population will experience a greater number of
internal armed conflicts (Brückner 2010). The second natural logged variable and third control
variable is pwt_rgdp, which measures the GDP at constant 2017 national prices in U.S. dollars.
This variable originally came from a dataset created by Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer (2015). I
chose this as my third control variable, since it has been commonly accepted with the literature
that a ‘wealthier’ state or a state with higher GDP will experience a smaller number of internal
armed conflicts compared to ‘poorer’ states or states with a smaller GDP (Vestby et al. 2021).
The datapoint covers 171 countries between the years 1950 to 2019.
Analysis of Data and Discussion:
Table 1: Youth Unemployment and Internal Armed Conflict 1991-2019
Youth Unemployment

0.003**

Ethnic Fractionalization

(.001)
0.187***
(.048)

Total Population (natural log)

0.279***
(0.012)

Real GDP (natural log)

-0.103***
(0.010)

Constant

-3.238***
(0.137)

Observations

4227

R-squared

0.147

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; Standard errors in parentheses.
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The linear regression model indicates that while youth unemployment has a positive and
statistically significant influence on the number of internal armed conflicts that a given state will
experience, it only has a small impact. The positive direction of the coefficient supports the
belief that higher levels of youth unemployment contribute to armed violent, yet the size of the
coefficient reveals the relatively weak impact of the independent variable compared to the
control variables. In more technical terms, the model indicates that for every one percent increase
in the youth unemployment rate, a state will experience a 0.003 unit increase in the number of
internal armed conflicts. These results support my hypothesis, which was modeled after the
widely held assumption. However, the small size of the coefficient also provides support for the
arguments of other academics that unemployment may not be the biggest motivating factor for a
state to experience violent internal armed conflict. While the youth unemployment variable is my
central explanatory variable, it reported the smallest coefficient-among my independent
variables. This illustrates that while high rates of youth unemployment can lead to a state
experiencing a greater number of internal armed conflict, it is not the most influential variable.
This result has obvious policy implications for donor groups and NGOs wishing to
decrease the levels of violence a state experiences through programs that increase the rates of
unemployment for young people. These entities spend considerable amounts of money every
year with the justification that this is the best way to ensure that insurgent groups cannot
manipulate opportunity costs to make violent rebellion a more attractive choice. These groups
attempt to influence the labor market in order to absorb the growing number of individuals aging
into the workforce in areas with high levels of poverty, thus making it more difficult for young
people to be recruited. However, if youth unemployment is not the greatest motivating factor for
the number of internal armed conflict a state experiences, this aid should be redistributed to other
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programs that have a greater peace-making effect. While the opportunities cost framework is the
most persuasive and widely held, my identification of two other causal mechanisms provide
other avenues through which to address the relationship between youth unemployment and
violent conflict.
Ethnic fractionalization reported outputs that were predicted by my hypothesis and
widely accepted assumptions within the discipline. Specifically, the positive direction of the
coefficient was expected, as well as the presence of statistical significance. While the coefficient
is not necessarily a large value, it does indicate greater influence than youth unemployment. The
model reported that for every unit increase in the ethnic fractionalization of a given state’s
population, the number of internal armed conflicts the state will experience increases by 0.187
units. The results both supports and is supported by the general thinking that ethnic
fractionalization and tensions have the potential to increase violent behavior and conflict. The
level of statistical significance and larger coefficient suggests that ethnic fractionalization has a
greater influence on the number of internal armed conflicts than youth unemployment.
Interestingly, the natural log of the total population had the largest coefficient and impact
on the number of internal armed conflict that a state experiences. The model indicated a positive
direction for population’s influence on the dependent variable and reported that for every unit
increase in the total population of a given state, the number of internal armed conflicts can be
expected to rise by 0.279 units. This control variable also reported statistical significance and
resulted in outputs that were expected from my hypothesis and widely accepted assumptions
from literature. The larger coefficient and statistical significance indicate that total population
has a greater effect on the number of internal armed conflicts a state experiences than youth
unemployment rates.
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The natural log the real GDP was the only variable with a negatively signed coefficient,
as expected from my hypothesis and commonly accepted literature. The model reported that for
every unit increase in a state’s real GDP, a decrease of 0.103 units in the number of internal
armed conflicts that a state will experience can be expected. This variable also reported high
statistical significance similar to the other control variables. The larger coefficient and statistical
significance indicate that real GDP has a greater effect on the number of internal armed conflicts
a state experiences than youth unemployment rates, but not as great an influence as do the other
control variables.
Limitations:
Future analyses should seek to remedy the two greatest challenges that this paper may not
have overcome: an absence of large-scale cross-national data on youth unemployment, and the
possibility that unemployment is not the only correct measure but should instead encompass
underemployment. These limitations should inform any future research on the need to be more
mindful of the models and data, since a simplified opportunity cost framework comparing
employment options excludes key contexts that influence a youth’s decision to join an insurgent
group. The assumption that young unemployed people cause greater levels of armed conflict is
somewhat reductionist, as it denies the possibility that a young person’s only motivating
influence is their income, without any weight placed on other socio-political factors.
The first limitation, the absence of data, is a limitation confronted by most research on
this topic. My model was constrained to the only 28 years that youth unemployment data has
been collected, limiting any possible historic trends that can be found. Many scholars note at the
end of their papers that “there is still far too little good large-scale statistical data available to
assess this [relationship] at the large-N comparative level” (Cramer 2015, 4). Moreover, it is
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even harder to find “accurate, up-to-date, comprehensive, gender and age-disaggregated data on
youth in developing countries” (Idris 2016, 2). There is little reliable data in states experiencing
high rates of youth unemployment and consistent occurrence of internal armed conflicts, making
it extremely difficult to understand the relationship between employment status and participation
in insurgencies. Most countries that have donor programs funding employment schemes are the
same ones without reliable data, further complicating the situation. These reduce the statistical
robustness of most models that attempt to capture the relationship between youth unemployment
and political violence. Political scientists and economists will continue to accept and promote the
assumed relationship between youth unemployment and violence, even if it is at best, statistically
weak, and at worst, inaccurate.
Additionally, only using unemployment as the main measure rather than including
underemployment limits the strength of the model and any possible statistical significance.
However, this limitation is also constrained by the first, given that most developing countries and
states experiencing internal armed conflict do not keep a record of individuals who are
underemployed. The dataset I used for this paper did not contain a variable measure for underemployment as well, mirroring other literature unable to find an accurate and operationalizable
measure. It is the absence of gainful employment that contributes to feelings of frustration,
embarrassment, and stagnation, and eventually to violent behaviors.
Concluding Thoughts:
Given the widespread acceptance of the assumption that high rates of youth
unemployment lead to a greater likelihood that a state experiences internal armed conflict, I set
out to ask: To what extent does youth unemployment status affect the number of internal armed
conflicts within a state? I hypothesize that countries with higher levels of youth unemployment
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will see a larger annual number of internal armed conflicts than will countries with lower levels
of youth unemployment. This relationship exists via a three main causal mechanisms: 1) the
opportunity cost calculation, which makes insurgent activities appear more attractive since they
have the potential to offer greater income-earning options; 2) a young individual’s private
frustration, resentment and feelings of stagnation turning into public grievances, leading to the
decision to take up arms to establish a new governance and social order; 3) the standard metrics
for adulthood becoming unattainable because of worsening economic conditions for people
entering adulthood, leading to violent behavior in order to obtain them. In order to assess my
hypothesis, I run a linear regression model using a variable measuring the number of internal
armed conflicts in a state as my dependent variable and rates of youth unemployment as my
central explanatory variable. I recoded my dependent variable to include instances where a state
experienced no conflicts in a given year, rather than allowing the model to interpret the data as
‘missing’. In addition to these two variables, I used three other control variables: ethnic
fractionalization, real GDP, and total population. I took the natural log of the latter two variables
in order to ensure that there would be more normal distribution and reduce the discrepancies
between any given states.
My results support my hypothesis: youth unemployment does have a positive effect on
the number of internal armed conflicts within a state, and any unit increase in the rate of youth
unemployment should be reflected in an increase the number of violent internal conflicts. My
central explanatory variable was statistically significant, although with a small coefficient
relative to the other outputs. My other variables fulfilled their predictions, that 1) higher ethnic
fractionalization leads to a greater number of internal armed conflicts; 2) greater total population
leads to a greater number of internal armed conflicts; and 3) countries with higher levels of real
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GDP will see to a lower number of internal armed conflicts. All three of these variables reported
statistical significance, and coefficients larger than what was reported for my central explanatory
variable. These results provide some empirical support for the wide-spread presumption that high
rates of youth unemployment lead to more violent armed conflicts. However, the coefficient of
the central explanatory variable was much smaller than those of the other three variables,
indicating that these factors have far more influence on the number of internal armed conflicts
than youth unemployment rates. The relative weakness of the youth unemployment variable
compared to the other variables indicates that aid dedicated to reducing a state’s potential for
internal armed conflict could be better spent elsewhere, rather than simply trying to increase the
rate of formal youth unemployment.
My research supports much of the literature on this subject, which notes that while there
may be some validity to the belief that youth unemployment potentially leads to higher rates of
violent conflict, there is not enough empirical support to either confirm or deny it. My model
reporting large disparities in the coefficients indicates that other factors may have a more
influential effect on a state experiencing armed conflict. This illustrates that while youth
unemployment may be a necessary factor in the degradation of society leading towards violent
armed conflicts, it is not sufficient for this to occur. This advances the notion that youth
unemployment may have some contributing factor to the decision to engage in violent behavior,
but there are stronger contextual factors. The causal frameworks for why young people may
choose to engage in violent behavior and join insurgency groups have been thoroughly
theoretically examined, yet without robust empirical support.
Political economists are divided on the acceptance of this presumption, given the
intractable gap between theory and evidence. Researchers and academics should be wary of any
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literature that tout a strong, automatic empirical link between youth unemployment and internal
armed conflict, especially given the absence of data on the topic within developing countries and
states experiencing high rates of conflict. Future research should examine models that are able to
work around this limitation, and possibly smaller in scale in order to truly assess the strength of
the major theoretical frameworks. It would also be worthwhile for future research to question
how insurgent groups recruit and what methods they use, as another pathway for assessing the
theoretical frameworks. Insurgent tactics are an important contributor to the opportunity cost
calculations of unemployed individuals, and their motivations can provide useful insight to the
role that youth unemployment has on internal armed conflict. Additionally, future research
should also look directly at the programs being implemented to increase the labor market and
rates of formal employment to test whether they have an effect on a state’s experience with
internal armed conflict. The wide-spread presumption that young unemployed people cause
violence has real world implications, with countless dollars being spent by NGOs and donor
groups with good intentions. If this assumption is empirically unfounded, regardless of how
persuasive the theoretical frameworks are, the aid money would be redirected to programs that
can actually promote peace while helping the most vulnerable.
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